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NOTES ANm Com_,NTs
of the right to give or withhold consent to the adoption of his child.
Statutes should be carefully worded to insure the right of the natural
parent, with or without present custody, not to have the permanent
parent-child relationship terminated by adoption by another with-
out his consent, unless that parent's neglect of duty to the child has
been flagrant.
P. JoANr SKAGGS
MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY IN KENTUCKY
The law of manufacturers' liability in America has evolved a long
way from the 1842 English case of Winterbottom v. Wright1 to the so-
called "modem view" of the 1916 American case of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.2 In order to attempt to classify Kentucky's present
position in such cases, a brief summary of this evolution would appear
to be in order. Winterbottom v. Wright is one of the most discussed,
but unfortunately oft-misunderstood cases in the law. In this case the
court held that one who had contracted with a buyer to keep a mail
coach in repair was not liable on the contract to a third party for in-
juries caused by disrepair. Certain dicta of the judges were so grossly
misunderstood, however, that a "general rule" of tort evolved from
the case that the original maker or seller of goods was not liable for
the damages caused by his negligence in manufacture, or failure to
inspect, to anyone except his immediate buyer.
As is usual, exceptions were made to the "general rule." Probably
the most significant of these were summarized in the 1903 case of
Huset v. 1. 1. Case Threshing Machine Co.3 as follows: 1) Where a
manufacturer does a negligent act, imminently dangerous to human
life in preparation of articles intended to preserve, destroy or effect
human life he is liable to third parties injured by his negligence.
2) Where an owner invites one to come onto land and use defective
instruments, he is liable for an injury caused by the defective condi-
tion of the instruments. 3) Where one sells or delivers an article which
he knows to be "imminently" dangerous, because defective, without
giving notice of its qualities, he is responsible to any person who suf-
fers an injury therefrom which might have been reasonably anticipated.
Later cases condensed the rule into liability for the negligent manu-
facture of articles "inherently" dangerous, in describing the first ex-
110 M. & W. 109, 152 E. R. 402 (1842).
2217 N.Y. 882, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
'120 F. 865 (1903).
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ception, and liability for manufacture of articles "imminently" danger-
ous, in describing the third exception, based on knowledge of the
defect. There was much confusion as to what articles should be
classified as "inherently" dangerous and what articles were merely
"imminently" dangerous. Usually, such articles as poisons, food, drugs,
explosives and firearms were designated "inherently"; others "im-
minently" dangerous.
In the case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,4 involving a defect
in the wheel of an automobile, Judge Cardozo refused to limit lia-
bility of manufacturers for negligence to cases involving such articles
as deadly weapons, explosives, poisons, and other articles generally
deemed to be "inherently" dangerous. In deciding the case on the
basis of foreseeability of harm in the absence of care,5 and establishing
the "modern view", Judge Cardozo said:
Subtle distinctions are drawn by the defendant between
things inherently dangerous and things imminently dangerous, but the
case does not turn upon these verbal niceties. If the danger was to
be expected as reasonably certain, there was a duty of vigilance, and
this whether you call the danger inherent or imminent."
The first Kentucky case found involving manufacturers' liability
was the 1906 case of Heindirk v. Louisville Elevator Co.7 Here, the
court conditioned liability for negligently injuring a third party on
whether or not the article by which the party was injured was an
article "imminently"8 dangerous. The case involved a machine con-
sisting of a ball and socket joint on a piece of heavy machinery. In
sustaining a demurrer to the petition the court laid down the rule
that a manufacturer is not liable to a third party for negligence unless
the article is "imminently" ("inherently"?) dangerous to human life.
The court implied that for recovery to be allowed for injuries sustained
by defects in ordinary articles, fraudulent concealment had to be
shown. It would therefore appear that the court took the same ap-
proach presented in J. I. Case, supra and limited liability for negligence
to a small class of articles which the Kentucky court called "im-
minently" dangerous, but which the other courts called "inherently"
dangerous.9
The court soon reiterated the dictum in the Heindirk case that
'Supra, note 2.5 Italics throughout the article are the writer's.
'Supra, note 2 at -, 111 N.E. 1050, 1054-1055. REsTArEMNT ToRTs, section
395, codifies this rule.
122 Ky. 675, 92 S.W. 608 (1906).
' It is submitted that the court confused the terms "inherently" and "im-
minently" dangerous as understood in the J. I. Case case.
'Chief Justice Hobson, in quoting Judge Freeman, also used the term "in-
trinsically" dangerous.
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fraudulent concealment had to be shown to allow recovery for in-
juries sustained from defects in ordinary articles. In a 1907 case,10 the
court announced the rule in such cases to be that the seller is not
liable unless either the article is an "imminently" ("inherently"?):
dangerous article or the seller has knowledge of its defects, and they
are such as to endanger life or property of one who has no notice of
the defects. Thus, Kentucky again recognized the third "exception"
of the J. 1. Case case to its rule, by annexing the fraud or deceit ad-
dition. The court refused recovery in this case where a defendant
sold oil as a lubricant to plaintiff and a glass tube on his stationary
steam engine exploded, injuring plaintiff's eye. Plaintiff alleged the
oil caused the explosion, but the court refused to classify the oil as
"intrinsically" ("inherently"?) dangerous and found no deceit or sci-
enter.
In the 1911 case, The Pullman Co. v. Ward,'2 the court laid
down the rule that the manufacturer is liable if he knows the article
to be defective and thus "imminently"13 dangerous and fails to give
notice of its dangerous qualities or conditions to any person injured
therefrom whom it might reasonably be anticipated would be injured,
and is in fact injured. Here we see again the appearance of the third
"exception" of J. I. Case, placing liability on the manufacturer in cases
involving noninherently dangerous articles for something like fraud.
In 1911, with Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer,14 the Kentucky court
approached the "modem view". It is interesting to note that in decid-
ing the 1916 case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., it would appear
Judge Cardozo relied somewhat on this Kentucky case.15 In the Ken-
tucky case, recovery was granted to one injured by a defective rumble
seat in an automobile. The Kentucky court held that the fact that the
manufacturer may not have had actual notice of the defect does not
relieve him of liability, for the defects, being apparent, constituted
notice, and representations that the article was safe were said to be
sufficient concealment. In this case, Judge Carroll's dictum limited
"Inherently" dangerous articles to poisons and drugs and clearly in-
dicated that the manufacturer is liable for his negligence in manu-
Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245 (1907).
"Again, it is submitted, the court has confused the terms "inherently" and
"imminently" dangerous as understood in the J. I. Case case.
"143 Ky. 727, 137 S.W. 233 (1911).
" Here the manufacturer concealed a defective brake rod on a railroad car
with paint and the court would appear to define "imminently" dangerous as it was
defined in the third "exception" of the J. I. Case case. The court apparently re-
fused to classify a railroad car with a defective brake rod as an "inherently"
dangerous article.
14145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047 (1911).
Supra, note 2.
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facturing other articles even though he has no actual knowledge of
the defects. It is concluded, therefore, that while the case was pur-
portedly decided on the basis of fraud because of the duty, springing
from constructive notice, to disclose defects, it actually predicated lia-
bility on negligence, and it would appear reasonable to assume that
Judge Cardozo in deciding MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. harbored
this view also.
It is also noteworthy that Judge Carroll in the Olds case said that
many articles were "imminently" dangerous-"in fact a great many
articles, in comon use, unless they are safely and properly con-
structed." We see then for the first time that the Kentucky court ap-
peared to have broadened the J. I. Case third "exception", and paved
the way for the "modem view" of basing liability on negligence.
The next year, 1912, in the case of Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. Me-
Math's Admr.,1 the court indicated that a manufacturer who puts a
defective "inherently" or "imminently" dangerous article on the market
will be liable to any injured person who had no notice of the defect.
The instant case involved a seller, not a manufacturer, however, and
different rules were indicated for each. Kentucky then, it would ap-
pear, again anticipated the "modem view" to be laid down in the
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. case as it had previously done in the
Olds case. As the article involved was paint dryer and not an ex-
plosive per se, and hence probably not an "inherently" dangerous
article, we see liability based on negligence where a mere "imminently"
dangerous article is involved. Thus, it would appear, the distinction
of J. L Case is abolished here unless the court used the terms "in-
herently" and "imminently" as synonymous-which the writer submits
they did not. It is noteworthy that Judge Carroll also decided this
case, lending more credence to the contention that the terms were not
confused.
Unfortunately the supposed approach to the "modem view" suf-
fered a retrograde movement in the 1913 Stone v. Van Noy Railroad
News Co.'7 case. This was the first of Kentucky's "soft-drink bottle
cases." In this case the court said that liability was imposed on manu-
facturers in two different classes of case: 1) For negligence in the
manufacturer of "intrinsically" and "inherently" dangerous articles,
and 2) For knowingly concealing or misrepresenting soundness in
articles known to be unsound. The first class was said to include
poisons and dangerous drugs and the court stated that it was held in
the Olds case that the maker of an automobile could be held liable
148 Ky. 265, 146 S.W. 770, 435 (1912).
153 Ky. 240, 154 S.W. 1092 (1913).
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only for concealing known defectsl Applying the rule to the defective
bottle in this case, the court found that the bottle was not "intrinsically"
or "inherently" dangerous. Further, since there was no evidence that
the manufacturer knew the bottle was defective there could be no
liability for concealment of defects. The court then added that there
was no evidence for finding the defendant was even negligent since
the evidence produced was equally consistent with no negligence so
the writer must admit the case is somewhat inconclusive as to estab-
lishing any general rule.
It would appear that the court did not interpret the Olds case as
the writer believes Judge Cardozo did and did not follow the "modem
view" which appeared in the case. Rather, it is submitted, the court
clearly returned to the old 1. 1. Case doctrine and its first and third
"exceptions."
Continuing in retrograde, or at least making no forward movement,
the 1924 case of Osheroff v. Rhodes-Burford Co., 18 refused to recognize
the principle laid down in the Olds case. Here, a porch swing broke
after seven months suspension because of crystallization of its metal
hook. A woman seated in the swing suffered a fractured ankle. The
court's dictum indicated that the manufacturer was not liable to third
person who had no contractual relations with him for negligence in
construction, manufacture or sale unless the article is "inherently" or
"imminently" dangerous. Although this case has been approved as an
instance in which an article involves no risk of serious harm, 19 it is
submitted that in fact there is such a risk involved and that the court
was in reality making the old distinction between articles "inherently"
and "imminently" dangerous. The court emphasized that the seven
month's use possibly caused the crystallization of the hook. It is sub-
mitted that this argument is rather weak when we think of many porch
swings that have swung for generations without this type of mishap.
The more recent cases are inconclusive as determinants in estab-
lishing a firm rule in Kentucky's law of manufacturers' liability. For
purposes of discussion, we shall classify two of these cases as "explo-
sives" cases.
In Kentucky Independent Oil Company v. Schnitzler, Administra-
tor,2 0 a 1925 case, a person was injured by the explosion of a mixture
of gasoline and kerosene which he believed to be only kerosene and
used to kindle his fire. The court allowed recovery on a negligence
theory. The opinion clearly indicates that the court classified the
'8203 Ky. 408, 262 S.W. 588 (1924).
PRossER, Toars, 679 (1941).
208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570 (1925).
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mixture as an "explosive" and decided the case squarely on the "in-
herently" dangerous article theory.21
In the 1944 case of Rankin v. Harlan Retreading Co.,2 2 the court,
by implication, seems to have extended the scope of the I. I. Case ex-
ception one. Suit was brought by one who was injured when tire re-
pairing material he was using exploded. The injured party sued the
vendor, not the manufacturer. The court held that a seller is not
liable unless he knew the article was an explosive, and hence "in-
herently" dangerous, and failed to give warning of this fact. The court
added, however, that a manufacturer's duty as to the giving of notice
is different; that a manufacturer is required to warn of the danger
whether he has actual knowledge of the explosive nature of the article
or not. It is submitted that if this dictum is followed negligence in
the manufacture of the article is immaterial. The highest degree of
care may have been exercised in the preparation of the article, yet the
manufacturer will still be liable if he fails to give notice to consumers
that the article is explosive. Thus, when "inherently" dangerous
articles are involved, the manufacturer has not only the duty to exercise
care in preparation but also a duty to warn that the article is inherently
dangerous though carefully made.
The next two "recent" cases, are so-called "soft-drink bottle cases".
In the first of these, the 1926 Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton
23
case, twenty-seven bottles exploded. The court followed the Olds case
and placed the bottles in exception three of the I. I. Case decision-
that is, the manufacturer who knows of defects which make an article
"imminently" dangerous will be liable to consumers if he fails to give
notice thereof. On the basis of the fact that so many bottles exploded,
the court said, in effect, that the defendant must have known of the
defect, thus presuming the element of knowledge as was done in the
Olds case. It is thought that this case does not indicate any new
philosophy but simply represents an isolated situation where the facts
were such that the Olds case could be followed.
The second, and more recent "soft-drink bottle case", Nehi Bot-
tling Company v. Thomas,2 4 demonstrates that in 1930 the court had
not abandoned the general rationalization of the old 1. 1. Case "excep-
tion" one. This case was not an "explosive" situation but one of foreign
matter in the drink itself. This of course allowed an easy path to follow
1 It is interesting to note that even the vendor's "gross negligence" would not
absolve the manufacturer from liability, since the manufacturer could foresee the
vender would sell the article.2298 Ky. 461, 183 S.W. 2d 40 (1944).
- 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W. 778 (1926).
236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W. 2d 701 (1930).
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by basing recovery on the "inherently" dangerous classification of food 25
as provided in the first "exception" of J. 1. Case to the 1842 Winter-
bottom "rule". The case further indicated that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may apply when the manufacture of food is involved. Later
"bottle" cases28 involved the applicability of the res ipsa loquitur doc-
trine and it is apparently assumed in all these cases that a manufacturer
is liable on proof of negligence. This might indicate that the court
does consider, as Prosser flatly stated, that all "soft-drink bottle cases"
deal with food, whether there is foreign matter in the drink, an ex-
plosion of the bottle, or other defect. It is submitted, however, that if
this be true it is a recent innovation and it would be as easy and more
realistic merely to place these cases along with other manufacturing
cases, allowing recovery for negligence on the basis of foreseeability
of harm in the absence of care.
There are only two recent manufacturers' liability cases not in-
volving "bottles" and "explosives"; the court treated them very dif-
ferently. In 1929, in the case of Payton's Administrator v. Childers
Electric Co.,27 the court presented the rule that a manufacturer of an
article not "inherently" dangerous but "manifestly" dangerous because
of negligent construction, is liable for injury reasonably to be antici-
pated. The court cited both J. I. Case and MacPherson. The court
said,
The early cases limited this exception (J. I. Case) to
things in their nature destructive, such as poisons, explosives, and
deadly weapons, but the tendancy recently has been to extend this
exception to include any article imminently dangerous, whether in-
herently so or not, and we think the exception as extended is sound
in principle.'
The court then held that the manufacturer of an electrically operated
crane was liable for his negligence where a third party was injured
thereby. Again then, the Kentucky Court upholds the "modem view,"
this time placing itself on a middle ground between the MacPherson
and Olds cases. It is significant that constructive notice of the defect,
an element thought necessary in the Olds case, did not receive such
attention in the instant case. Although there is an indication of re-
'Of course it is clear that foreign matter in the drink itself is a matter con-
cerned with food and that these cases decided on the food-"inherently" dangerous
articles basis are not nearly so remote as would be a decision based on this fact
in the other "soft-drink bottle cases" as discussed in this note and as commented
on by IuossEn, TORTS 676-677 (1941).
" Leobig's Guardian v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 259 Ky. 124, 81 S.W. 2d
910 (1935); Frank Fehr Brewing Co. v. Corley, 265 Ky. 308, 96 S.W. 2d 860
(1936). See also: 23 Ky. L. J. 534.
228 Ky. 44, 14 S.W. 2d 208 (1929).
Id. at 48, 14 S.W. 2d at 209.
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luctance to release the antiquated J. I. Case terminology, the court
clearly has at this point refused to limit liability to any set group of
articles when negligence is evidenced.
Undoubtedly the most disturbing indication that Kentucky has
never fully departed from the antiquated approach in manufacturers'
liability cases is the 1944 case of Davis v. Glass Coffee Brewing Co.29
Here, a defective handle on a glass coffee brewer broke when the
brewer was being lifted from the stove. The person lifting the hot
brewer was scalded. The court refused recovery because the plaintiff
failed to allege the article was "imminently" dangerousl Surely the
scalded arm was mute evidence that even a coffee brewer, harmless
enough in itself, is such an article that if negligently made may fore-
seeably inflict injury. This case demonstrated a direct return to the
superannuated and unrealistic approach of the J. I. Case case unless
the theory could be advanced that the court refused to recognize that
it was foroseeable that a coffee brewer with its scalding contents, if
defectively made, might inflict injury.
In summary, it is submitted that Kentucky has developed a rule
for manufacturers' liability which is a cross between the Case rule and
McPherson rule. The court has never accepted fully the view of lia-
bility that it helped pioneer and has not completely abandoned the
obsolete J. 1. Case view. Would it not be more realistic and practical
to establish the rule in Kentucky in these cases based on the "modem
view" of foreseeability of harm in the absence of care without resort to
J. I. Case case terminology and without resort to fictional constructive
notice in order to bring a case within the Case rule? It is believed by
the writer that if this approach were adopted Kentucky would be more
likely to render substantial justice in each case than it would by en-
gaging in fruitless attempts to classify articles by inconsistent and in-
efficient terms. It is further submitted that if Kentucky adopted this
rule it would turn to the very rule it helped initiate and on which the
majority of courts in the country base liability in manufacturers' lia-
bility cases.30
HENRY V. PENNINGTON II
-296 Ky. 706, 178 S.W. 2d 407 (1944).
' See: PRossER, TORTS 678 (1941); Russell, Manufacturers' Liability to the
Ultimate Consumer, 21 Ky. L. J. 399, (1933). Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability
to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees 24 VA. L. R. 139; HmaPE, A
TREATISE ON THE LAw OF TORTS, p. 243 (1933) and RESTATENEENT, TORTS, sec.
395. It is readily apparent that there is not a wealth of material available in Ken-
tucky law on the subject of manufacturers' liability. The last case found was the
Davis case-decided almost a decade agol Realizing that Kentucky is not an in-
dustrial state as such, nevertheless, it is indeed strange that such a long period
has evidenced lack of these cases.
